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ABSTRACT 
Hospitals and healthcare facilities are not able to singularly mitigate the patient surge 
from a mass-casualty incident or pandemic health event. The potential volume of patients 
demands that regional healthcare communities be able to respond as a unified body to 
maintain the resiliency of their healthcare systems. The National Healthcare Preparedness 
Program advocates the establishment of fully functional, response-ready regional 
healthcare coalitions to meet this need. 
Establishing a regional healthcare coalition requires that an appropriate 
governance structure be established, a proper level of participation be solicited, and 
adequate funding mechanisms be put in place. This thesis offers a case study of how 
these factors influence the ability of three existing and distinctively different healthcare 
coalitions to prepare for a patient surge from a mass-casualty or pandemic health event. 
The thesis also shows the influence of each of the factors on a coalition’s sustainability. 
The coalitions researched were Palm Beach County, Florida’s Healthcare 
Emergency Response Coalition, King County, Washington’s Healthcare Coalition, and 
Jacksonville, Florida’s First Coast Disaster Council. These three coalitions highlight 
differences and similarities in the governance structure, participation needs, and funding 
mechanisms of existing regional healthcare coalitions and show how each influences 
catastrophic patient surge mitigation in their region. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Preventing another terrorist attack on the United States of America has taken a 
front stage seat to preparedness since the horrific events of September 11, 2001, that took 
the lives of just under 3,000 victims. Post-911, legislative and funding priorities were 
initially focused on law enforcement and intelligence agencies rightfully tasked with 
preventing another attack on the United States. But the reality is that man-made terrorist 
events are not the only cause of mass-casualty incidents. Natural disasters, pandemic 
health events, or critical infrastructure failures could also lead to a large number of 
human casualties. Whether the events are man-made or natural, preparing for mass 
casualty incidents requires integration of the nation’s healthcare community to establish 
and plan for the patient surge capacity required to support such events. 
The general public assumes that hospitals in the United States are adequately 
prepared for a disaster of any magnitude and ready at a moment’s notice to accept every 
victim in need of emergency medical care. Currently most hospitals operate over capacity 
with little to no room for a patient surge of any magnitude, let alone the numbers seen in 
a mass-casualty or catastrophic health event. A 2005 study by the Center for State Health 
Policy at Rutgers University found the number of hospitals in the United States that 
consistently operate at or above capacity increased from 19 percent in 2000 to 30 percent 
in 2005.1 Shortage in medical surge capacity is further exemplified through the decline in 
community hospitals from 5,455 in 1989 to 5,008 in 2009, an eight percent drop with no 
additional reserve added to state or government facilities during that same time.2  
                                                 
1 Dwindling Supply of ER Beds: Implications For Hospital Surge Capacity; DeLia, Derek and Wood, 
Elizabeth; The People to People Health Foundation, Inc Project Hope; Nov/Dec 2008 
2 Trendwatch Chartbook 2010: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems: Chapter 2 Table2.1. 
American Hospital Association http://www.aha.org/aha/researchreports/tw/chartbook/ch2.shtml 
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In 2004, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) made an effort 
to address the patient surge crisis by releasing a benchmark for surge capacity. AHRQ 
recommended surge capacity in every region to be “500 staffed beds3 per 1,000,000 
residents made rapidly available in the event of a disaster.”4 Meeting this benchmark 
cannot feasibly be the responsibility of a single hospital or healthcare provider in any 
given region. A unified approach must be taken to meet the potential demands of a 
catastrophic healthcare event. The unified approach advocated by the Department of 
Health and Human Services is through the establishment of regional healthcare coalitions 
involving every member of a region’s healthcare community. 
Creating a unified coalition of independent, often competing healthcare agencies 
and disciplines will undoubtedly bring numerous challenges in the formation of the 
coalition’s governance structure and in garnering the participation needed for the 
sustainability of the coalition. Additionally, questions concerning funding mechanisms 
for the coalition could prove to be either a hurdle or an asset to individual participation 
and group sustainability.  
Regional healthcare coalitions can offer a long-term solution to the issue of mass-
casualty and pandemic surge capacity by offering a unified approach involving the 
“whole-of-the healthcare community.” Research into appropriate governance structures, 
participation needs, and funding mechanisms is needed to enhance the establishment and 
sustainability of regional healthcare coalitions across the nation. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Primary question: 
How can we implement regional healthcare coalitions to better enhance medical 
surge capacity and capability for mass-casualty or pandemic health events?  
 
                                                 
3Note: “Staffed beds” refers to total emergency department, intensive care, general, mental health, and 
pediatric availability with assigned staff responsible for patient care. 
4Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Bioterrorism and Health System Preparedness, Issue 
Brief no. 4, Pub. no. 04-P009 (Rockville, Md.: AHRQ, 2004) 
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Secondary questions: 
How does the governance structure of a regional healthcare coalition influence 
medical surge capacity and the sustainability of a regional healthcare coalition? 
How does participation in a regional healthcare coalition influence medical surge 
capacity and the sustainability of a regional healthcare coalition? 
How does the funding mechanism of a regional healthcare coalition influence 
medical surge capacity and the sustainability of a regional healthcare coalition? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Disasters can strike at a moment’s notice, with little to no warning for the 
community affected. Practical plans for allocating resources, interoperable 
communications, and continuity of services must be in place at all times in anticipation of 
a patient surge from a mass-casualty or pandemic event. This is most true for the 
healthcare system, where a majority of hospitals routinely operate above capacity, each 
unable to absorb any additional patient surge that could result from a disaster.5 Regional 
collaboration among members of the entire healthcare community is needed to ensure 
that continued medical care is available in the event of a catastrophic health event. The 
coalition model is an appropriate format with which to organize the healthcare 
community. Coalitions are defined by the Reference for Business Encyclopedia as “a 
group formed to pursue a strategy that will be to the advantage of those most directly 
affected.”6 
This research focuses on how regional healthcare coalitions have been 
implemented to provide a viable solution to the patient surge seen in many catastrophic 
health events. While the federal government is promoting and financially supporting the 
establishment and extension of regional healthcare coalitions, it is not mandating that a 
specific structure be used across every region. It is the intent of this research to evaluate 
                                                 
5 Jane Akre; “U.S. Hospitals Unprepared for Attack”; May 8, 2008; InjuryBoard.com 
http://news.injuryboard.com/disaster-plans-lacking.aspx?googleid=238632  
6 Reference for Business Encyclopedia; Coalitions Defined; 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/Bun-Comp/Coalition-Building.html 
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three existing and distinctively different regional healthcare coalitions and to examine the 
influence of their governance structures, participation needs, and funding mechanisms.  
It is understood that healthcare coalition needs will vary depending on the 
demographic and geographic makeup of each region in the United States. The research 
provides support for the idea that the foundation for sustainment and success for a 
healthcare coalition includes governance, participation and membership in the coalition, 
and long-term funding mechanisms that support the equipment and training needed to 
maintain the healthcare community’s readiness to respond to a catastrophic patient surge. 
Ultimately, this research seeks to examine how three structurally different 
existing coalitions have implemented various strategies that center on governance, 
increasing participation and membership, and long-term funding support. Benefit should 
be realized by regions that have not yet established a healthcare coalition through 
providing insight into the need for a coalition and examples of existing models that may 
reflect their particular healthcare community. The research should also provide benefit to 
regions with existing coalitions that are in need of strengthening their governance 
structure, participation and membership, or funding mechanisms. 
 5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review was to identify the impact of a regional 
healthcare coalition in preparing a community for medical-surge capacity related to mass-
casualty or pandemic events. The review identified relevant sources that affect a 
healthcare community’s readiness and the manner in which each component of the 
healthcare community independently affects the structure, participation, and funding of a 
healthcare coalition. The literature review covered local, state, and federal requirements 
to determine which regulations aid in the preparedness effort and which hinder it. 
Academic literature from subject matter experts in the healthcare industry was reviewed 
to assess the recognition of the need for healthcare coalitions. Literature on 
organizational behavior was reviewed as it relates to interagency and interdisciplinary 
partnerships through the structure of a coalition.  
A. EXISTING RESEARCH INTO HEALTHCARE COALITIONS AND 
SURGE CAPACITY 
1. History and Background  
In response to the anthrax scare of October 2001—which highlighted the need for 
the nation’s hospitals to be able to assess and treat a catastrophically large number of 
patients who could fall victim to a bioterrorism attack—the Department of Health and 
Human Services established the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program 
(NBHPP) in 2002. The NBHPP provided funding for hospitals to enhance their ability to 
appropriately respond to a biological attack. This included providing decontamination 
equipment, stockpiling antidotes and antibiotics, and basic training for bioterrorist 
attacks—a decidedly top-down approach to implementing preparedness. 
In 2006, President Bush signed into law the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act, which among other things established the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR). The NBHPP was immediately moved under the 
ASPR. It shifted its focus to an all-hazards approach and officially removed “National 
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Bioterrorism” from its name. As the newly reorganized Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP), it was better positioned to work with the nation’s hospitals and other healthcare 
providers to build resiliency and capability into the system, regardless of whether the 
health crisis was a pandemic, bioterrorism, a natural disaster, or a man-made attack. 
In 2007, ASPR contracted with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to 
review the first five years of the Hospital Preparedness Program and determine its impact 
on hospital preparedness and resiliency.7 The study revealed that the HPP had in fact 
made response to “common medical disasters” more resilient. It revealed a weakness, 
however, in the healthcare community’s capacity to handle a catastrophic health event.8 
The report by the University of Pittsburgh recommended that the healthcare community 
focus on creating “regional healthcare coalitions” and supporting existing healthcare 
coalitions in an effort to better position the healthcare community to respond to the not-
so-common, or “black swan” catastrophic health event.9 
As a result of the study by the University of Pittsburgh, the Hospital Preparedness 
Program had another name change. The ASPR realized the need to include the “whole-
of-the-healthcare community” in solving patient surge and to broaden its focus beyond 
hospitals alone. In 2010, the Hospital Preparedness Program became known as the 
National Healthcare Preparedness Program (NHPP); it now includes healthcare partners 
in both the public and private sectors. The 2011/2012 budget for the NHPP is directly 
related to the recommendations of the University of Pittsburgh study in that it is focused 
largely on establishing new regional healthcare coalitions and expanding those in 
existence through a whole-of-community approach involving a multitude of healthcare 
partners at the operational level.  
                                                 
7Hospitals Rising To The Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program 
and Priorities Going Forward, The Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
2011; http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009-04-16-hppreport.html 
8 Hospitals Rising To The Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program 
and Priorities Going Forward, The Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
2011; http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009-04-16-hppreport.html  
Printed Copy; Pp. 2 
9 Nassim Nicolas Taleb; The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable; Random House 
Books; Kindle E-Reader Location 427 
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2. Local, State, and Federal Literature 
Local recommendations come by way of city ordinances and generally do not 
carry the punitive weight of a federal regulation, which attaches medical payments to 
compliance. Local regulations are, however, the most pertinent pieces of legislation 
related to the actual healthcare capabilities of a community. Ensuring that a coordinated 
effort exists between pre-hospital, hospital, and ancillary healthcare providers demands 
that local standards be established and maintained. The literature review of local city 
ordinances in this study focused on Jacksonville, Florida; Palm Beach County, Florida; 
and King County, Washington. Each of these locations reveals a theme of collaboration 
through various outlets, such as the use of an electronic hospital reporting system that is 
tied to local emergency-dispatch centers and is open to all participating healthcare 
entities; the elimination of hospital diversion capabilities; and the inclusion of 
nontraditional healthcare and public-safety partners in preparing for disasters.  
States have input into the healthcare system through regulatory and licensing 
powers. A review of state statutes offered insight into some of the challenges that 
regional healthcare coalitions face, particularly with regard to funding. States are the 
primary recipients and managers of federal grant funding and as such are able to mandate 
active participation in a regional coalition. A review of state responsibilities concerning 
grant distribution highlights how funding mechanisms influence regional healthcare 
coalition establishment, sustainability, and production. States also have the ability to 
determine regional designations and mandate that all supporting agencies align with the 
state-determined regions.10  
The federal government has recognized the importance of a coalition framework 
in the many directives and mandates it has issued since the creation of the Office of 
Homeland Security in October of 2001.11 Use of the terms “collaboration” and 
                                                 
10 Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Department of Emergency Management Report: 
Assessing Florida’s Anti-Terrorism Capabilities September 2001; Project Guiding Principles Item #4 
Implement recommendations for improvement using existing regional model. Pp3.     
11 Creation of DHS; http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/gc_1297963906741.shtm  Office of 
Homeland Security officially became the Department of Homeland Security with the passage of the 
Homeland Security Act in November of 2002 
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“coordination” can be found in nearly every piece of legislation regarding homeland 
security. Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated that the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) build a comprehensive national incident 
management system with federal, state, and local government personnel. It also mandated 
that DHS develop programs for interoperable communications among all emergency 
responders in the nation.12 Since that time, the federal government has expanded the 
scope of interoperability and collaboration to include the healthcare community through 
mandated National Incident Management System training, grant funding for interoperable 
communications systems, and a focus on a national strategy for public health and medical 
preparedness as seen in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) #21. 
Presidential Directive #21 supports the establishment of a national strategy for 
public health and medical preparedness.13 The directive can be used as a guideline to 
regions developing healthcare coalitions, as well as an evaluative tool for existing 
coalitions. The directive lists the following key principles for healthcare preparedness:14 
• Preparedness for ALL potential catastrophic health events; 
• Vertical and horizontal coordination across levels of government, 
jurisdictions, and disciplines; 
• A regional approach to health preparedness; 
• Engagement of the private sector, academia, and other nongovernmental 
entities in preparedness and response efforts; 
• Importance of individual, family, and community roles in preparedness. 
These key principles are drawn from the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the 
2004 Biodefense Strategy for the Twenty-first Century.  
                                                 
12 HSA 107-296, 107 Cong., Public Law 2135 (2002) (enacted). Homeland Security Act of 2002 
13 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness; 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1219263961449.shtm#1 
14 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness; 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1219263961449. Background Data #5 
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B. SURGE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY NEEDS 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)—8 required the establishment 
of a national policy to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other major disasters.15 The 
National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), the National Planning Scenarios, Target 
Capabilities List (TCL), and the Universal Task List were the result of HSPD—8. Each 
document serves to either define the vision for preparedness or to establish priorities and 
desired capabilities. Strengthening medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities is one 
of the eight priorities listed in the National Preparedness Guidelines. Medical surge is 
defined by NPG as  
the rapid expansion of the capacity of the existing healthcare system in 
response to an event that results in increased need of personnel (clinical 
and non-clinical), support functions (laboratories and radiological), 
physical space (beds, alternate care facilities) and logistical support 
(clinical and non-clinical equipment and supplies).16  
The TCL details the planning, organizing, equipment, and training needed to 
achieve the desired level of medical-surge capacity and capability.17  
In addition to the 2004 recommendation by AHRQ calling for a benchmark of 
500 staffed beds per million residents for pandemic medical treatment,18 the TCL also 
recommends that each region be able to triage, treat, and stabilize 50 cases per million 
population for patients suffering traumatic injuries, burns, radiation, or other effects of 
                                                 
15 Preserve Protect Respond Recover Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines U.S. Department of Homeland Security  2007 Preface Pp. iii; 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf   
16 Preserve Protect Respond Recover Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf;  Pp. 449 
17 Preserve Protect Respond Recover Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf;  Pp. 7 
18 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Bioterrorism and Health System Preparedness; Issue 
Brief no. 4, Pub. no. 04-P009 Rockville, Md.: AHRQ, 2004 
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biological warfare.19 This number is above the current daily staffed bed capacity for each 
region. Determining how best to accomplish this target capability demands a 
comprehensive look at every healthcare asset in each region in an effort to identify 
resources and to engage key stakeholders in planning for any sudden patient surge. The 
plans should provide for continual collaboration, interoperability, and coordination of all 
regional assets.  
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response contracted the development of the Medical Surge 
Capacity and Capability Handbook. The handbook originally focused on single hospital 
assessment, training, and response to medical surge issues. It was revised in 2007 after 
the events of hurricane Katrina highlighted the need for a more regional approach to 
mitigating mass surge from a catastrophic health event. Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability (MSCC) broadened the plan to incorporate healthcare coalitions in tier 2 
(Figure 1).  
ASPR contracted an additional handbook titled, The Healthcare Coalition in 
Emergency Response and Recovery (HCERR) as an addendum to the MSCC. HCERR 
was written, “to develop a management system or framework that promotes public health 
and medical system resiliency and maximizes the ability to provide adequate public 
health and medical services during events that exceed the normal medical capacity and 
capability of an affected community.”20 “Surge capacity” is defined by MSCC as the 
ability to respond to a markedly increased number of patients while “surge capability” is 
defined as the ability to address unusual or very specialized medical needs.21 MSCC 
intends that surge capacity and capability should initially be handled at the local level  
 
 
                                                 
19 Preserve Protect Respond Recover Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf;  Pp. 462 
20 Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Introduction   
21 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Chapter 1.1.2 
 11 
through active and functional healthcare coalitions that are capable of assessing all 
regional healthcare needs and assets and transferring the information to a higher tier if 
necessary.  
 
Figure 1.   MSCC Tiered Response (From: 22) 
                                                 
22 Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Figure1.2 Page 1–8 
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Figure 2.   Relationship of MSCC Tiers 2, 3, and 4 (From: 23) 
A review of the coalition framework recommendations outlined in MSCC against 
the actual frameworks of the three cases studied highlights differences in structural 
governance, funding mechanisms, and participation—and the impact, if any, that each 
has on coalition functionality. 
C. SUSTAINABILITY NEEDS OF A HEALTHCARE COALITION  
Healthcare coalitions at their core comprise a group of independent entities with 
singular goals and missions, brought together for a common cause. Selecting the 
appropriate governance structure for a coalition is aided by knowledge of complex 
organizational behavior. There is no one set structure that all regions should follow when 
establishing a coalition of healthcare providers. An understanding of the personal and 
working relationships among key stakeholders in the healthcare community is needed to 
                                                 
23 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007; Chapter 1.4.3 Incident Command versus Incident 
Support 
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guide the formation of each coalition. While the Mass Surge Capability and Capacity 
Handbook provides a guideline for establishing a coalition, it does not prescribe a 
specific set of governance instructions. Instead, it describes common elements of an 
effective coalition that can be applied to any locale.24 This knowledge, coupled with 
insight into complex adaptive systems, enhances the discussion of governance structure 
of regional healthcare coalitions. 
Group formation needs related to complex systems also provide insight into those 
factors that influence the sustainability needed for regional healthcare coalitions. A 
complex system is defined as “a system with a large number of elements, building blocks, 
or agents, capable of interacting with each other and with their environment.”25 Using 
this definition, the healthcare community can be defined as a complex system. Louise 
Comfort, a professor of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, 
researched the many complex systems involved in response to the events of September 
11, 2001, and hurricane Katrina. Her research revealed that all too often a discrepancy 
between policy and practice exists in complex systems.26 Comfort details the basic 
premise of the complexity theory: “The initial conditions in any situation set the 
trajectory for the evolution of a complex, dynamic system such as a disaster response.”27 
Her work highlights the importance of choosing an appropriate governance structure 
when forming a coalition of members from a complex system. She also supports the need 
for clearly defined goals and objectives as foundational necessities for a complex system. 
The governance structures of each coalition were assessed for the presence of and focus 
on a mission and vision statement. 
                                                 
24 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Project Scope 
25 What is a Complex System? Northwestern Institute on Complex Systems; September 3, 2009; 
Retrieved from http://www.northwestern.edu/nico/complexity-conference/program.html 
26Louise K. Comfort, Kim Ko, & Anthony Zagorecki; Coordination in Rapidly Evolving Disaster 
Response Systems: The Role of Information; 2004, Pp. 48 - 295. Center for Disaster Management, 
Retrieved from University of Pittsburgh  
27 Louise K. Comfort, Fragility in Disaster Response: Hurricane Katrina. The Forum, 3, 2005, 1st ser., 
2-2.Retrieved from Berkeley Press. 
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Dr. William Pelfrey, a noted scholar in Homeland Security studies and former 
professor at Virginia Commonwealth University, describes the integral components of 
collaboration and interoperability needed for disaster preparedness. He defines 
preparedness as a cycle with specific elements that must be addressed for complex 
response to be adequate. These elements include collaboration, information sharing, 
interoperable response procedures, and shared recovery goals.28 He details the integral 
parts of collaboration to be collegiality, trust, flexibility, openness, mutual respect, social 
capital, and pathways of communication. The elements listed by Comfort and Pelfrey 
regarding collaboration and interoperability among complex and dynamic systems are 
present in every healthcare system and are addressed through the promotion of an action-
oriented coalition that has, as Dr. Pelfrey describes, “a shared understanding of the goal 
to be achieved, knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of each agency, 
collegiality, trust, flexibility, openness, mutual respect, social capital, and pathways of 
communication.” Coalitions must have active participation to ensure their success. 
Lessons on collaboration and information sharing are vital to every healthcare coalition 
as it solicits participants from within the healthcare community. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Recent events, such as the 2005 hurricane season culminating in Katrina, the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic flu season, and the 2011 Joplin tornado, highlight the fact that 
prevention alone will not keep our nation safe. Preparedness for the patient surge that 
could accompany a disaster of any magnitude is necessary for all facets of the healthcare 
community. An overview of literature related to homeland security preparedness and 
response supports a shift in focus to the local level. The literature revealed a consistent 
theme of the need for a “whole-of-community” approach in preparing the local healthcare 
system. Regional healthcare coalitions embody this “whole-of-community” approach as a 
viable solution to the patient surge that will accompany a catastrophic health event. The 
role of the healthcare community during a disaster is recognized at all levels of society, 
                                                 
28 William V. Pelfrey, (n.d.). "The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework" Berkeley 
Electronic Press. Retrieved September 08, 2010, from http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/5/ 
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from the private citizen who trusts in his local hospital’s ability to treat every patient of a 
disaster to the federal government’s commitment in making that public trust a reality 
through promoting the establishment of regional healthcare coalitions.  
The literature on healthcare coalitions supports the idea that one of the most 
important aspects in creating a coalition of independent agencies from within the 
healthcare community is having firsthand knowledge of the region, forming a sound and 
regionally appropriate governance structure, soliciting specific participation from key 
stakeholders as well as the healthcare community as a whole, and identifying multiple 
funding streams to ensure sustainability. 
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Research for this thesis will utilize case study methodology involving three 
existing regional healthcare coalitions. The case study methodology was selected for two 
reasons: first, it provides insight into how three distinctively different coalitions have 
each shown that a regional healthcare coalition could be implemented as a solution to 
catastrophic patient surge; and second, examining these three cases provides an 
opportunity to better understand how the different governance structures, funding 
mechanisms, and participation within a coalition all influence surge capacity and the 
sustainability needed for a regional healthcare coalition. Each case was compared against 
the guidelines set forth by the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in the 
2007 handbooks: Medical Surge Capacity and Capability: A Management System for 
Integrating Medical and Health Resources during Large-Scale Emergencies and the 
accompanying Healthcare Coalition in Emergency Response and Recovery handbook.  
B. SAMPLE 
The three coalitions chosen for this research were Palm Beach County, Florida’s 
Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition (HERC); King County, Washington’s 
Healthcare Coalition (KCHC); and Jacksonville, Florida’s First Coast Disaster Council 
(FCDC).  
Palm Beach County was chosen for several reasons. First, it is the only entity that 
has published a textbook on establishing a healthcare coalition, titled Establishing a 
Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition. The founders of the HERC have valuable 
insight into coalition formation and the governance structure needed to shift the focus 
from an existing task force model to a fully functional and inclusive coalition of 
healthcare providers. Palm Beach County’s HERC also provided information on unique 
funding mechanisms in its use of a private healthcare foundation. 
 18 
Jacksonville, Florida’s FCDC was chosen primarily because of personal insight I 
have into that organization. It also represents the smallest and least funded or formally 
structured of the three coalitions, while also representing one of the most active coalitions 
with regard to participation and membership. FCDC provides lessons learned in soliciting 
appropriate members and the importance in creating an active role for the members. 
FCDC also offers options for funding that go beyond financial support to include 
personnel, equipment, supplies, and training opportunities.  
King County, Washington’s KCHC was chosen because it is the program 
espoused by the Department of Health and Human Service’s Healthcare Preparedness 
Program as a model program for regional healthcare coalitions. KCHC offers the largest 
and most formally structured healthcare coalition of the three. It is also the most highly 
funded coalition that was researched; complete with a full-time dedicated staff collocated 
within the county’s Department of Public Health.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
The three cases were analyzed using qualitative comparison analysis, 
concentrating on three specific factors of each case to determine how they influence 
medical-surge capacity in the event of a mass-casualty incident and also how each factor 
influences the sustainability of the coalition. Data was obtained from each specific 
regional healthcare coalition’s distributed publications, coalition websites, firsthand 
knowledge from coalition membership, conference attendance at healthcare coalition 
workshops, and regional healthcare coalition toolkits. 
The first factor analyzed was the governance structure that each coalition assumed 
and how it had arrived at that specific structure. Next, the level of participation and 
membership was analyzed for each coalition, with emphasis on how participation is 
solicited and sustained. The last factor analyzed was the funding mechanism that each 




Comparing three distinctly different regional healthcare coalitions also required a 
tertiary look at geographic and demographic differences in each region in an effort to 
highlight various options for achieving the same goal of sustaining preparedness for a 
mass-patient surge. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. BACKGROUND OF EACH CASE 
The Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition (HERC) in Palm Beach County 
was one of the first in the nation. On October 4, 2001, the office of the National Enquirer 
in Boca Raton, Florida, became the sight of the nation’s first anthrax attack. The initial 
unknowns concerning how many people were infected and what the extent of exposure 
would be led the healthcare community in Palm Beach County to realize that it was not 
prepared to take care of the volumes of critical patients that an anthrax attack could likely 
produce. HERC has since grown into a model program emulated throughout the state. 
The original members of the coalition are credited with writing the only textbook to date 
dedicated to establishing a healthcare emergency response coalition.29 HERC is unique 
from the other two coalitions due to the challenge that it faces with jurisdictional power 
struggles related to the multiple city and county governments that encompass the 
coalition’s region.  
The next coalition examined was First Coast Disaster Council in Jacksonville, 
Florida. FCDC was established in the early 1980s, long before Palm Beach County’s 
HERC, with its original intent being only to address joint accreditation training for local 
hospitals. This early recognition of the need for collaboration in training was born of 
necessity more than ingenuity, given the sheer geography of Jacksonville, Florida: it is 
the largest city per square mile in the United States. Hospitals owned by a single parent 
company were often located 20 or more miles apart, while a competitor hospital might be 
across the street. The logistics of joint training for accreditation purposes was a win-win 
for all parties involved and was more easily coordinated through the use of a single 
body—the First Coast Disaster Council. FCDC has evolved to include pre-hospital 
providers, public health officials, nongovernment organizations, private partners, and 
nontraditional members, such as mass transportation entities, all focused on improving 
                                                 
29 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 
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regional response to a healthcare crisis. Jacksonville’s FCDC was originated as a loosely 
structured group of partners with a shared need. The evolution to a fully integrated 
coalition took time but has resulted in strong bonds among partners who share in 
leadership roles and responsibilities and active participation from all members.  
The last coalition examined was the King County, Washington, Healthcare 
Coalition. KCHC was chosen because it is the program espoused by the Department of 
Health and Human Service’s National Healthcare Preparedness Program as the national 
model for healthcare coalitions. KCHC is fully funded, staffed, and coordinated through 
the regional public health department. The King County coalition is structured with 
formal leadership and forced participation for all grant-funded regional healthcare 
training and exercises. This formal structure provides insight into organizational benefits 
and challenges of active versus passive participatory involvement from the coalition’s 
members. 
B. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE  
Webster defines “coalition” as “an alliance of distinct parties, persons, or states 
united for joint action.”30 A coalition of healthcare partners is remarkably unique, given 
that most of the members needed for the coalition are in competition with one another on 
a daily basis but would be completely dependent on each other during a catastrophic 
health event. By raw definition the healthcare community fits perfectly into the coalition 
model with “distinct parties … united for joint action.” 
In examining the appropriate governance structure for a specific healthcare 
coalition, several foundational pieces of information are relevant. Healthcare coalitions 
by their very nature and mission are nonprofit, noncompetitive entities with a primary 
focus being region-wide preparedness for and resiliency from the patient surge that a 
catastrophic health event would bring. Individual goals and objectives must take a back 
seat to this shared mission.  
                                                 
30 Merriam Webster online dictionary, http://www.dictionary.reference.com. 
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Regardless of a coalition’s structure, it should address specific functions such as 
the ability to create consensus and communicate a shared vision, the capacity of all 
partners to implement practical strategies, the legal ability to apply for and accept state, 
federal, and foundation funding, and the power or authority to achieve desired levels of 
regional preparedness for a catastrophic health event.31 Knowing that members of a 
healthcare coalition represent interests from both public and private sectors, the model for 
governance structure in a healthcare coalition should also be organic, flexible, and open 
to sharing of power with nontraditional partners.32  
The MSCC handbook suggests that a central focus in the formation of a regional 
healthcare coalition is the development of an emergency operations plan (EOP). The EOP 
should describe how the coalition is structured and how it will respond during an 
emergency.33 The handbook further recommends that the following considerations be 
addressed when developing the EOP: 
• Establish a diverse EOP writing team with members from the various 
disciplines represented in the coalition; 
• Establish an internal and external review process to be used throughout the 
development of the EOP; 
• Promote buy-in from executive leaders of each member organization by 
highlighting advantages of coalition membership; 
• Incorporate the NIMS principles in the EOP consistent with public 
partners. 
The MSCC guidelines for developing an EOP are consistent with the overall 
principles advocated in coalition formation—diversity in group involvement, buy-in from  
 
 
                                                 
31 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 Kindle Location 988 of 2343 
32 Pat Bradshaw, Bryan Hayday, Ruth Armstrong, Johanne Levesque, and Liz Rykert; “Nonprofit 
Governance Models: Problems and Prospects”; 1998 ARNOVA Conference; Seattle Washington 
http://www.aota.org/Governance/ProceduralAdHoc/Handouts/Model.aspx 
33 Pat Bradshaw, Bryan Hayday, Ruth Armstrong, Johanne Levesque, and Liz Rykert; Nonprofit 
Governance Models: Problems and Prospects; 1998 ARNOVA Conference; Seattle Washington 
http://www.aota.org/Governance/ProceduralAdHoc/Handouts/Model.aspx 
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key partners, and interoperability with partners. Each of the three coalitions researched 
approached governance with these key principles addressed in sometimes similar and 
sometimes strikingly different manners. 
 
Figure 3.   Healthcare Integration (From: 34) 
                                                 
34 Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; Public Health Emergency Workgroup; Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response 2007; Introduction MSCC Project Scope 
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1. Palm Beach County—Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition 
The Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition in Palm Beach County is a 
multiagency organization coordinated through the Palm Beach County Medical Society’s 
Disaster Preparedness Committee. HERC was created as a result of two very different 
precipitating events—hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the anthrax attacks of 2001. Both of 
these events tested the region’s response to an actual and a potential mass-patient surge 
into the local healthcare system. Individually, each event shaped the governance structure 
of the HERC into what it is today. 
On August 24, 1992, hurricane Andrew made landfall in south Florida. Andrew 
was a category-five storm that resulted in 65 deaths and over $26 billion in damages.35 
Several hospitals and other healthcare providers in the region were damaged by high 
winds and rain; many lost generator power, and patients had to be evacuated to other 
facilities. Hospitals in the region that were not physically damaged or closed by the storm 
saw an immediate patient surge from self-transporting patients, patients transported by 
EMS, and interfacility transfers from hospitals and shelters damaged by the storm. 
Assistance was eagerly given to the affected facilities through volunteer staffing and the 
distribution of supplies, as well as much-needed space for patient care. The assistance 
provided, while eagerly given, was not optimally distributed. The storm was a true wake-
up call to the region for a unified plan that would better enable the healthcare system to 
rapidly absorb a mass number of patients from a storm-stricken community or from a 
storm-damaged regional facility.  
The Palm Beach County Medical Society immediately organized a Hurricane 
Preparedness Task Force focused on preparing the local hospitals for a similar natural 
disaster.36 This task force remained active and focused on the single task of preparing 
hospitals for hurricanes and storm surge. The Hurricane Task Force remained active with 
                                                 
35 Note of Explanation: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale: Category 5 – Sustained winds greater than 
155 miles per hour. http://www.sun-sentinel.com/topic/disasters-accidents/meteorological-
disasters/hurricanes/hurricane-andrew-%281992%29-EVHST000062.topic 
36 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 Kindle Location 308 of 2343 
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waxing and waning participation, dependent primarily on the time of the year and the 
storm season predictions. The focus of the task force rarely ventured beyond hurricane 
preparedness or the neat and orderly predetermined, pre-storm patient transfer plans 
among a few regional hospitals.  
Their commitment to preparedness was dramatically reawakened on 
September 11, 2001. The events of that day caused the task force to realize the need for a 
broader focus on all-hazard disaster preparedness. It also prompted the healthcare 
community to insist that it be included in every disaster preparedness and response 
discussion within its region. 
The hurricane task force scheduled a meeting for October 4, 2001, to discuss 
broadening its focus to address man-made, biological, or chemical disasters that could 
result in a catastrophic number of patients coming into their healthcare system. This was 
the exact day of the second precipitating factor in the formation of the HERC. During the 
morning meeting on October 4, 2001, several hurricane preparedness task forces 
members’ pagers began to ring, alerting them of an anthrax incident at the building of the 
local American Media Institute, which publishes the National Enquirer.37 The Palm 
Beach County Medical Society was instantly faced with the potential impact that an 
inhalation anthrax outbreak could have on its local healthcare system. Not unlike most 
healthcare communities across the United States, Palm Beach County did not have the 
capacity or capability to locally address the patient surge that an anthrax attack could 
present. It was paramount that the entire healthcare community join forces with local 
emergency response organizations, private healthcare providers, and public service 
agencies in preparing for a catastrophic health event that could cripple the region’s 
healthcare capabilities through the sheer volume of patients that could potentially need 
medical care.  
The Medical Society’s Disaster Preparedness Committee and the hurricane task 
force merged with the county’s Terrorism Task Force and broadened its scope to prepare 
                                                 
37 Homeland Defense Journal, 5 Years Later: How the Anthrax Attacks Created HERC, October 2006 
Vol.4, Issue 10; Pp 26-28 
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for and respond to all hazards, not just hurricanes or biological or chemical warfare.38 
Moving from a group of individuals organized as either a task force or a committee to a 
coalition involved more than simple semantics. Coalition formation required restructuring 
the separate groups, broadening their outreach, and focusing all of their efforts on a 
common goal. 
The Palm Beach Medical Society led the restructuring effort by hiring a nationally 
recognized consultant to develop and facilitate the initial coalition.39 The consultant was 
used to create common protocols that each hospital could implement with little disruption 
in its daily operating procedures. Hospital emergency-response support partners were 
identified, including Palm Beach County’s Department of Health, Palm Beach County 
Emergency Management, Palm Beach County Fire and Rescue, the Palm Beach County 
Sheriff’s Office, and the Palm Beach County Healthcare Foundation.40 Representatives 
from the thirteen local hospitals, along with representatives from the aforementioned 
emergency response partners, started to formally meet with the consultant acting as the 
lead in the coalition.  
The consultant convinced the CEOs of all thirteen hospitals to sign a 
memorandum of understanding in support of the coalition. Each hospital agreed to share 
staff, supplies, and bed space during a time of disaster.41 The consultant asked the CEOs 
to name one designated and two alternate representatives to the coalition. Members of the 
newly formed coalition developed a formal mission and vision statement, as well as 
operating guidelines for the group.  
The formal governance structure evolved over time from an authoritarian model 
with a single leader directing and forming the initial actions of the individual agencies to 
a self-organizing system where leadership roles are recognized and shared among all 
                                                 
38 Homeland Defense Journal, 5 Years Later: How the Anthrax Attacks Created HERC, October 2006 
Vol.4, Issue 10; Pp 28 
39 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 Kindle Location 622 of 2343 
40 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 Kindle Location 622 of 2343 
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members in the coalition. Utilizing an outside consultant with no local ties to the 
community or stakeholders proved effective for Palm Beach County in creating its 
regional healthcare coalition. Power struggles were never allowed to hinder the initial 
formation of the coalition’s structure. 
HERC is headquartered at the Palm Beach County Medical Society. 
Administrative responsibilities for the coalition are delivered by a full-time staff member 
of the medical society. With 38 different jurisdictions located within the county of Palm 
Beach, organizing the coalition through a central nonpartisan agency like the county 
medical society has proven effective as a central focal point for all coalition matters. 
Policies and procedures for the coalition are decided by an elected board. The coalition 
elects from its membership a single leader known as the chair; it also elects the following 
positions: vice-chair, treasurer, and secretary. The chair is utilized primarily to conduct 
meetings and to represent the face of the coalition at formal events. HERC also has 
regionally specific steering and subcommittees, each led by a committee chair who 
reports to the coalition chair and various members based on need and input into the 
committee. Current committees are education/training, syndromic surveillance, and 
communications. Each of these positions is voluntary, with no one paid for any of his 
services. Everyone who accepts a position in either a leadership or committee chair role 
has a primary job within one of the member organizations. Leadership and committee 
roles are divided among different member organizations and disciplines in an effort to 
maintain the diversity and collegiality that is important in a complex organization. No 
one group or entity is allowed to commandeer any area. Formal meeting protocols 
following Robert’s Rules of Order are used at every meeting. Voting members are able to 
make motions or propose votes based on a predetermined quorum present. Minutes are 
kept and agendas are followed in accordance with Robert’s Rules of Order. All meeting 
minutes are a matter of public record and are kept on file at the Palm Beach County 
Medical Society. The governance structure of Palm Beach County’s Healthcare 
Emergency Response Coalition continues to evolve from the original authoritative model 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; 2010 Kindle Location 628 of 2343 
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to the self-organizing system in place today. This structure relies on each participant’s 
being focused on the same mission and purpose and having the ability to accomplish 
each. HERC’s mission states: “To develop and promote the healthcare emergency 
preparedness, response and recovery capability of Palm Beach County, Florida.”42  
The purposes given for HERC are: 
• To coordinate and improve the delivery of healthcare emergency response 
services. 
• Foster communication between local, regional, and state entities on 
community-wide emergency planning, response, and recovery. 
• Ensuring overall readiness through coordination of community-wide 
training and exercises. 
• Promote preparedness in the healthcare community through standardized 
practices and integration with other response partners.43 
Collectively the healthcare community is able to meet both the mission and 
purpose of the coalition through active involvement of all response agencies and the 
sharing of leadership roles among all participating members. 
2. Jacksonville, Florida—First Coast Disaster Council 
Jacksonville, Florida offers the least structured and least formal model in 
governance of any of the three. Relationships among member organizations are, however, 
some of the strongest seen from the three governance structures researched. This can be 
attributed in part to the long-standing interactions that members have had with each other 
through the early days of the FCDC. FCDC was originally established in 1983 as a 
private company made up of local pre-hospital EMS providers and a few area hospital 
training coordinators. It was initially categorized by the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) as a safety and security training consultant firm. This was 
somewhat misleading in that FCDC has never been hired or paid as a consultant. Like the 
HERC in Palm Beach County, it is organized as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.  
                                                 
42 Palm Beach County Medical Society; HERC Mission Statement; 
http://www.pbcms.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=pages.aboutherc 
43 Palm Beach County Medical Society; HERC Purpose; 
http://www.pbcms.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=pages.aboutherc 
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While maintaining the moniker of “council” in its name, FCDC has evolved to a 
true coalition format with a diverse membership all focused on the resiliency of the local 
healthcare system. FCDC exists independent of any local, state, or federal agency. It 
enjoys active involvement from agencies across all response disciplines through a 
collegial relationship fostered over many years of interaction. FCDC is led by an elected 
president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. Membership is open to all agencies and 
disciplines within the healthcare community. Monthly meetings are held at a 
predetermined location, generally a participating facility. The president leads the meeting 
using an informal, collegial version of Robert’s Rules of Order that allows open 
discussion while maintaining adherence to the agenda. FCDC currently has five 
committees that report to the group at every meeting. The committees are Special 
Needs—coordinated through the local Department of Health; EMS Advisory 
Committee—a report given by the local EMS medical director or physician 
representative; Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department (JFRD)—the primary fire and 
rescue 9-1-1 provider for Duval County; the State Medical Response Team (SMRT)—a 
report given to the membership by a local representative of the state team; and lastly, 
Training and Education—an appointed member of the group responsible for coordinating 
brief training sessions conducted during the monthly meeting. 
FCDC is a prime example of a governance structure being dictated primarily by 
geography, as opposed to being incident-driven like Palm Beach County’s HERC. 
Jacksonville is a single city/county encompassing all of Duval County. At 842 square 
miles, Jacksonville is also the largest city per square mile in the continental United States. 
This geographical reality makes jurisdictional authority more streamlined than regions of 
multiple jurisdictions with their often accompanying hierarchical power struggles. This 
reality also makes the central governing structure in Jacksonville/Duval County very 
powerful. City ordinances dictate much of the emergency response protocols. The elected 
mayor is the overall incident commander during any local incident that is declared a state 
of emergency. The mayor functions through the emergency management division with 
input from an executive council and the director of the Duval County Emergency 
Management Division (DCEMD). The executive council includes high-ranking officials 
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from public safety departments, public transportation and critical infrastructure 
departments, public health and public education officials, and adjacent city and county 
elected officials. FCDC is represented by proxy through the public health department at 
this level. 
DCEMD is a progressive and powerful body that leads the preparedness and 
response effort for the region and acts as the emergency operations center (EOC) for all 
regional response activity. DCEMD is the first two-time accredited emergency 
management department in the state of Florida. As such, many of the functions of a 
regional healthcare coalition that are outlined in the MSCC and HCERR are already 
addressed through the full-time staff at the DCEMD. Being geographically located in a 
region with a single powerful emergency management department has enormous 
benefits—a region-wide interoperable communications system; a patient-tracking 
software program accessible to all local hospitals, healthcare providers, and dispatch 
centers; a single jurisdictional authority; and easier access to regional training 
opportunities and funding—but it also presents several challenges. Unlike Palm Beach 
County where during times of disaster decision making authority and command staff 
inclusion is given to the HERC, FCDC operates strictly in a supportive role through 
Emergency Support Function (ESF)–8.  
During nonresponse times FCDC assumes responsibility for maintaining ongoing 
relationships among all hospitals and healthcare providers. Letters of agreement (LOA) 
signed between the FCDC and all participating hospitals dictate response actions among 
all hospitals. The agreements between the hospitals are vetted through open discussions 
at the monthly meetings and a clear understanding of the assets each has to offer the 
healthcare community as a whole. A copy of the LOAs are kept at the DCEMD and 
added to the regional disaster response plan. 
While FCDC assumes the leadership role in establishing and sustaining 
relationships among key players in the regional healthcare community, its true 
governance structure is one of supporting and advising the decision making county 
emergency management division. In this model, FCDC brings in players from the diverse 
healthcare community and fosters relationships through the elements that Dr. Pelfrey 
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describes in the preparedness cycle: collaboration, collegiality, trust, openness, mutual 
respect, social capital, pathways of communication, and information sharing.44 
3. King County, Washington—King County Healthcare Coalition 
The King County Healthcare Coalition (KCHC) offers a different approach for 
governance structure than those seen in Palm Beach County and Jacksonville. KCHC 
uses a top-down approach with formal leadership and hierarchy. The state and federal 
governments are actively involved in managing KCHC’s structure through the King 
County Department of Public Health. The coalition is administered through the Seattle 
and King County Public Health Department. KCHC is the youngest and largest of the 
three coalitions researched. It was established in 2005 through a federal grant from the 
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Research’s Hospital Preparedness Program. 
Grant stipulations dictate that KCHC place emphasis on public relations and marketing 
itself throughout the region. It has the most visible and informative online database of the 
three coalitions studied. KCHC’s website offers free resources for any region in need of 
establishing a healthcare coalition or enhancing an existing coalition through its online 
toolkit and various templates.45  
KCHC has a full-time paid staff of eight individuals located within the county 
public health department. KCHC is a self-described “inclusive body,” open to any 
organization that directly or indirectly provides health services within King County.46 
Participation in the coalition is through one of two routes: member or partner. 
Members are nongovernmental organizations that provide direct health services 
within the county.47 They are organized into sectors by the service they provide. Each 
                                                 
44 William V. Pelfrey; Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; “The Cycle of 
Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats”,  Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 5, 
2005,  
45 Strengthening Emergency Response Through Healthcare Coalitions; 
http://www.apctoolkits.com/kingcountyhc/ 
46 King County Healthcare Coalition Toolkit: 
http://www.apctoolkits.com/kingcountyhc/pages/how_to_build/governance.html   
47 King County Healthcare Coalition Toolkit 
http://www.apctoolkits.com/kingcountyhc/pages/how_to_buildmembers_ and_ partners.html 
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sector supports cross-organizational planning, training and decision making. Members 
are allowed to vote during coalition meetings and may select individuals to serve on the 
executive council, the governing body of the coalition. Partners are from governmental 
healthcare agencies and organizations. 
Partners include local fire departments, law enforcement, EMS, and emergency 
management divisions. These agencies and organizations participate in coalition meetings 
and serve on committees and work groups but are nonvoting members due to the nature 
of their primary responsibilities and their structural obligations during a time of disaster. 
The governing body of the KCHC is the executive council. The council is elected 
exclusively from the list of members. Partners are not able to serve on the executive 
council but provide professional guidance on discipline-specific matters. The executive 
council formally lists its duties and responsibilities:48  
• Establishing the mission and strategic direction; 
• Determining the Coalition’s legal and organizational structure; 
• Reviewing and approving the Coalition budget; 
• Providing policy level oversight of the Coalition’s committees, 
workgroups, and projects; 
• Approving regional and health sector emergency preparedness plans; 
• Representing the healthcare Coalition and advising the Local Health 
Officer on healthcare policy issues during a response. 
In addition to these duties and responsibilities, the executive council acts as the 
face of the KCHC, representing it at both ceremonial events and during disaster response 
operating within the incident command structure. The members of the executive council 
meet quarterly with the full-time staff at the public health department to review the 
budget, plan and coordinate training exercises, and establish response procedures that 
will be voted on by the membership at large. 
The executive council is a part of the unified command staff during a multiagency 
response, providing guidance on surge capacity and capability to the local health officer, 
                                                 
48 King County Healthcare Coalition Leadership; 
http://www.kingcountyhealthcarecoalition.org/about-the-coalition/our-leadership 
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EMS medical directors, and the medical examiner (figure 4). The ability to funnel all of 
the healthcare community’s availability statistics through the single coalition channel 
directly to the incident commander allows for mass-casualty response decisions to be 
made more accurately and effectively.  
 
Figure 4.   MAC Coalition Structure  (From: 49) 
The formal and powerful governance structure used by the KCHC proves 
beneficial in the following aspects of healthcare coalitions that this research examines: 
participation and funding. The emphasis placed on strengthening the region’s healthcare 
system is evident to all members of the healthcare community through the inclusion and 
mutual respect it receives from emergency management officials. 
                                                 
49 Advanced Practice Center Tool-kit: Establishing a Healthcare Coalition; Responding to 
Emergencies; Area Command & ESF-8; Multi-Agency Coordination Group; 
http://www.apctoolkits.com/kingcountyhc/pages/responding_to_emergencies/area_command.html   
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4. Conclusion 
The three coalitions studied in this thesis answer the questions concerning 
governance structure in a diverse manner. Each healthcare coalition had distinctively 
different beginnings, and each has subtle differences in organization and form. But the 
differences in each governance structure prove to matter little as they relate to answering 
the question of sustainability and preparing for the surge capacity needed for a response 
to a catastrophic health event. Each of the three coalitions has plans in place, and each 
has exercised its plans to mitigate the effects of the medical surge that a catastrophic 
health event could bring.  
Measuring the success of the governance structure for a given healthcare coalition 
is ideally based more on input and process measurements than on measuring outcomes. 
Outcome measurements require that a catastrophic health event occurs, which then tests 
the structure in real time with real-time consequences. Given that catastrophic events are 
rare, measurements based solely on outcomes will be too late. 
Input and process measurements, on the other hand, look at the individual 
components that make up a coalition and ensure that each component is focused on and 
capable of sustaining the healthcare system through a catastrophic healthcare event. 
Questions that will need to be asked when determining the appropriate governance 
structure for a region are “Who should be included in the coalition?”; “What could their 
role be?”; “How will each component work together?”; “Which member is in a position 
to provide the most influence?”; and most importantly, “Who has the jurisdictional 
authority to make decisions?” 
No matter which structure of governance a coalition takes, from the more 
informal supportive and advice-based coalition as seen with FCDC to the formal legal 
entity seen in KCHC, the type of governance structure chosen matters less than the fact 
that the structure be able to support the creation and sustainment of an active and 
functional healthcare coalition. The coalition must ensure that collaboration within the 
healthcare community extends beyond just mutual-aid agreements among members but 
that it fosters preparedness for any catastrophic health event that a region may face. 
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Geographical and demographic differences dictate that no one model of 
governance will fit every healthcare coalition. While governance structures may vary 
across regions, what is consistent for each coalition are the governance functions that 
must be performed. The definition of a coalition demands action as the premise to joining 
diverse members together. The actions that are needed by a regional healthcare coalition 
in addressing patient surge depends less on who performs them than they do on the fact 
that they be performed.  
 C. PARTICIPATION FACTORS 
Creating a coalition of members of the healthcare community demands that the 
“healthcare community” first be defined. Defining the most appropriate members is a 
vast undertaking involving disciplines from pre-hospital providers such as primary-care 
physicians, pharmacists, and emergency medical technicians to inpatient providers such 
as hospitals, nursing homes, and rehabilitation centers. The community must also include 
ancillary agencies such as county emergency preparedness divisions, fire departments, 
law enforcement, and public health departments. Each region will define its target 
members based on the knowledge that every independent member of the coalition is 
focused on the common goal of preparedness for and resiliency from a catastrophic 
health event. 
Small community and rural hospitals present specific challenges in getting them 
to participate in coalitions with larger facilities. Community hospitals are continual 
targets of large corporate healthcare entities, ready at any moment to merge with or 
acquire the smaller not-for-profit hospital. In 2010, there were 77 mergers and 
acquisitions involving 175 hospitals.50 This represented a 38 percent increase from the 
previous year. The constant threat of takeover makes some hospitals so leery about 
working with outsiders that they remain insular from any assistance related to surge  
 
 
                                                 
50 Irving Levine Associates, Inc: Health Care Services M&A Rebounds Strongly in 2010, According 
to Irving Levin Associates, Inc; http://www.levinassociates.com/pr2011/pr1103har17 
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capacity. The damage that an isolated approach to mass-casualty response could have on 
a community must be realized across every region in the nation and must be combated 
with collegial collaboration as seen in the coalition framework. 
Structuring this coalition of diverse members also warrants a foundational 
understanding of the culture in which the healthcare community exists. On the surface, 
the healthcare community may seem to operate as a simple system: If you have a medical 
need, you either self-enter the system through a doctor’s office or emergency room or 
you enter via a pre-hospital ambulance provider; your medical condition is then assessed, 
diagnosed, treated, and then you are discharged from the system until you need it again. 
Little thought is given to the complexity that a single patient brings to the system, let 
alone a mass influx of patients from a catastrophic health event. Hospitals and healthcare 
providers in fact operate in an extremely complex environment, continually balancing 
between chaos and order as each new patient enters the system. Staff allocation, supply 
expenditures, and patient distribution all factor into maintaining this important balance 
between a chaotic and orderly environment. 
Dee Hock, the founder and CEO of VISA, describes this space between chaos and 
order as “Chaordic.” He defines Chaordic as “any self-organizing, adaptive, non-linear, 
complex system whether physical, biological, or social, where the behavior exhibits 
characteristics of both order and chaos, or loosely translated to business terminology, 
cooperation and competition.”51 The healthcare system is the perfect example of a self-
organizing, adaptive, non-linear complex system that in a coalition framework will 
exhibit both cooperative and competitive characteristics in mitigating the effects of a 
catastrophic health event. Understanding this “chaordic” environment better defines the 
players needed to maintain the balance when the number of patients needing medical care 
spontaneously jumps from a routine to a catastrophic number. The reality for the 
healthcare system is that it relies on an enormous number of players from a multitude of 
disciplines to maintain order in a complex system. 
                                                 
51 Dee Hock; The Chaordic Organization: Out of Control and Into Order; 1995; World Business 
Academy Perspectives – Vol. 9, No. 1 1995. http://www.ki-net.co.uk/graphics/Dee%20Hock%20-
%20The%20Chaordic%20Organization.pdf 
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A community of independent healthcare agencies fits perfectly into the definition 
of a complex system given by Melanie Mitchell in her book Complexity: A Guided Tour. 
She defines a complex system as “a system in which large networks of components with 
no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, 
sophisticated information processing and adaptation via learning or evolution.”52 A 
complex system is further defined as “a system with a large number of elements, building 
blocks, or agents, capable of interacting with each other and with their environment.”53 
One strategy to get active participation from members in a complex system is to 
identify a smaller, critical subsystem or group that is susceptible to change and apply 
force to those individuals. In The Emergency Department as a Complex System, Dr. Mark 
Smith suggests a way to accomplish this by using the 85/15 rule.54 The 85/15 rule for 
complex systems says that it is possible to change or influence the entire system by only 
changing or influencing the critical 15 percent. One mantra for changing a complex 
system is to “find the rudder.” This saying comes from the idea that a large ship is a 
complex system involving many independent sub systems, but all that is needed to 
change the direction of the large vessel is to effect change on the small rudder. In using 
this theory in establishing an active and functional regional healthcare coalition, it may 
not be necessary to get initial buy-in from the entire healthcare community as long as you 
can “find the rudder” by identifying the critical 15 percent of the system. 
As expected with disaster response, many of the same disciplines and 
participating agencies are represented in each of the three cases researched in this study. 
While first responders and healthcare providers across the United States may wear 
different uniforms or have different titles, they share in the core mission and ability to 
protect the health and well-being of a community. The anatomical effects of a 
catastrophic bomb blast in Jacksonville, Florida, are no different from those of a 
catastrophic bomb blast in King County, Washington, or in Palm Beach County. There is 
                                                 
52Mitchell, Melanie;  Complexity: A Guided Tour; Oxford University Press 2009; Pp.30 
53 What is a complex system? Northwestern Institute on Complex Systems, 2009 Northwestern 
University, Recommended reading list for Introduction to Homeland Security   
54 Mark Smith M.D.; The Emergency Department as a Complex System; 2002 copyright Mark Smith 
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a finite amount of energy that the human body can absorb and a finite amount of blood 
loss that a body can tolerate. Treating these injuries involves universally accepted 
medical practices that span the globe. The participants needed to mitigate these injuries 
do not necessarily change for a mass-casualty incident; they only grow in numbers 
analogous to the number of patients.  
1. Palm Beach County—HERC 
Membership in the Palm Beach County Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition can be described in two words: benefit driven. Members are actively solicited 
from the entire regional healthcare community with benefits of membership being the 
selling point for participation. The governing arm of HERC, the Palm Beach County 
Medical Society, acts as the driving force behind all membership solicitation.  
There are currently 27 separate agencies represented in Palm Beach County’s 
HERC. Each agency representative is given one vote, with no one organization having 
authority over another. General membership is targeted to the following agencies, 
institutions and disciplines within Palm Beach County: 
• ESF 4—Fire Fighting, Lead Agency: Palm Beach County Fire and 
Rescue; 
• ESF 6—Mass Care, Lead Agency: American Red Cross; 
• ESF 8—Health and Medical, Lead Agency: Palm Beach County Health 
Department; 
• Special needs shelters; 
• ESF 16—Law Enforcement, Lead Agency: Palm Beach County Sheriff; 
• Support Agency for ESF 8, Lead Agency: Health Care District of Palm 
County; 
• Support Agency for ESF 8, Lead Agency: Palm Beach County Medical 
Society; 





• Palm Beach County Hospitals—All 15 regional hospitals and ancillary 
facilities; 
• Acute-care hospitals; 
• Specialty hospitals; 
• Mental-health centers; 
• Long-term care centers; 
• Blood centers; 
• Dialysis centers; 
• Palm Beach County Emergency Management Division; 
• Region 7 Chair—Region designated by Regional Domestic Security Task 
Force; 
• Veterinary agencies. 
HERC determined that in order to best define which partners to include in its 
coalition, it should first define the specific components needed for planning, 
preparedness, response, and recovery from a mass-casualty patient surge event.  
The first component addressed the need for a common communications system. 
Appropriate patient distribution in a mass-casualty situation demands that real-time data 
with two-way communications be readily available to all patient care and patient 
transportation agencies. Participating hospitals in HERC benefit from coalition 
membership through the region-wide implementation of an 800 MHz radio system that is 
interoperable with local emergency management officials and all first-responding 
agencies. This benefit comes at no cost to participating agencies. It was purchased with 
the first grant funding ever given to HERC from the Palm Healthcare Foundation.55 A 
dedicated hospital channel was identified for alerting all members at the same time of an 
actual or potential crisis. Hospitals were also given a matrix of additional channels with 
training on how to contact emergency-response partners in the event of an internal 
disaster or need.56 Communications are currently being bolstered through the 
implementation of a region-wide patient-tracking software system also purchased through 
                                                 
55 Palm Healthcare Foundation; http://www.palmhealthcare.org/history 
56 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location 657 of 2343 
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a coalition grant. Members will be given access to the tracking software along with 
training and any hardware needed.57 Complete interoperability for all members of the 
coalition is one of the stated goals of the HERC and one that will enhance recovery from 
a spontaneous patient surge in the region. 
Shared training opportunities are an additional benefit to participation in HERC. 
When planning for a mass-casualty patient surge from a catastrophic health event, it is 
understood that the entire healthcare community will be engaged. Training and exercising 
together is a valuable way to test the interoperability and coordination among agencies 
within the healthcare community for this type of event. Benefits of joint training and 
exercises also include the sharing of resources such as volunteers or classrooms, 
consistent curriculum and understanding of regional response policies, completion of 
hospital-mandated accreditation requirements, and perhaps most importantly, the 
highlighting of individual policies that may be purposeful in writing but not practical in 
action. Mitigating a mass-casualty incident requires the transportation of a large number 
of patients to various healthcare facilities; each member’s plan for patient distribution and 
care must not negate another member’s plan for the same need. Membership in the 
HERC provides these benefits, as well as providing financial benefits through the sharing 
of costs for the training. 
In Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition, the original 
members of HERC outline the following benefits that a coalition should provide its 
members: 58  
• A continuum of planning and preparedness before an event; 
• Collaborative response during an event; and  
• Shared recovery after events have occurred.  
                                                 
57 http://cache.trustedpartner.com/docs/library/PalmBeachMedicalSociety2009/2012BoardRetreat 
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58 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location 411 of 2343 
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2. Jacksonville, Florida 
Membership in the First Coast Disaster Council is voluntary and open to any 
member of the healthcare community and supporting agencies. Incentives to membership 
help drive the near 100 percent participation from local hospitals and the healthcare 
community, but the true success of FCDC’s active participation rests more with the 
manner in which the coalition members interact than in the tangibles that membership 
provides.  
FCDC member agencies receive many of the same benefits as those who 
participate in Palm Beach County’s HERC: interoperable communications, joint training 
and exercises, cost sharing and grant funding opportunities. But these benefits are driven 
more from the county emergency management division than the coalition itself. FCDC 
does not have a full-time staff; it does not have any online presence or marketing 
strategies; it is not affiliated with a large healthcare-related organization, such as the local 
medical society, but yet it still enjoys the same levels of participation as coalitions that do 
have these factors.  
FCDC utilizes an important aspect of group dynamics that helps it meet the 
participation needs of a coalition—active involvement. In the book Work and the Nature 
of Man, Frederick Hertzberg details his “two-factor theory” in gaining motivation for 
employees or, as exemplified in this case, coalition participants.59 The theory posits that 
there are two factors that determine the amount of effort someone puts forth in anything 
he does. Those factors are described as “satisfiers” and “motivators.”60 Satisfiers for 
coalition participation tap into extrinsic factors, including interpersonal relationships, 
quality of group leadership, meeting room conditions, ease in attending meetings, and 
group policies and procedures. Motivators are more intrinsic and include the importance 
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of the work of the group, individual responsibility given to members, achievements of the 
coalition, and recognition of one’s work by both fellow coalition members and outsiders.  
As stated in the governance structure of FCDC, it places great emphasis on 
collegiality and mutual respect for all members in the group and open membership to all 
healthcare providers and supporters of healthcare. This respect and collegiality is most 
likely the result of the long-standing relationship that FCDC has had with the healthcare 
community through joint training classes, exercises, and actual disaster-related events.  
A few members of FCDC, however, attribute their success in participation to 
“good old southern hospitality and having sweet tea at every meeting!”61 While this may 
in fact have more merit than some of the other factors in participation, it will respectfully 
and joyfully be categorized as collegiality for this study.  
Each of the extrinsic or “hygiene” factors is meant to keep members from 
becoming dissatisfied with group participation. Additional extrinsic factors are met 
through conducting meetings in a semiformal fashion, following a predistributed agenda, 
providing lunch (including sweet tea) to all attendees, and holding the meetings in a 
facility with an executive boardroom feel.  
The intrinsic factors that FCDC uses to keep members motivated and wanting to 
belong to the coalition include individual responsibilities assigned to each member, such 
as training or education assignments, inclusion in emergency disaster planning with high-
ranking officials outside the coalition, positive feedback from various parent 
organizations, recognition of coalition accomplishments, and personal acknowledgment 
of the importance of members’ work from actual mass-casualty events that other 
communities have faced. 
As an example, during a recent FCDC monthly meeting, the education portion of 
the meeting assigned to one of the members involved a “lessons learned” case study of 
the patient surge and patient evacuation needs of Joplin, Missouri, from May 22, 2011.62 
                                                 
61 Direct observation from members of FCDC during many monthly meetings I attend. 
62 Dennis Manley, Steve Bollin, Dr. Robert Dodson, Ron Fovargue, Bob Denton, and Renee Denton; 
Medical Response to Joplin, Missouri, August 2, 2011; After-Action Report and Lessons Learned  
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An EF5 tornado struck the town just after 5:30 pm on Sunday, May 22, 2011, destroying 
a local hospital. Mercy St. John’s Regional Medical Center took a direct hit from the 
storm, requiring that 189 patients be immediately triaged and evacuated to alternate 
facilities.63 It was a wake-up call to every healthcare community in the nation that 
assumes its hospitals are impervious to the effects of a disaster. The incident 
demonstrated the importance for the healthcare coalition to train together and to prepare 
for any of its regional facilities to become the target of disaster, while at the same time 
preparing all regional facilities to become part of the solution. The patient surge planned 
for might not come just from the outpatient population but could potentially come from a 
neighboring hospital’s inpatient population.  
This single scenario exemplifies the importance of identifying and gaining 
participation from all members of a healthcare community before a disaster strikes and of 
building relationships that foster adaptive, flexible, and appropriate response. Members 
of FCDC include representatives from the following regional entities: 
• Hospitals: all fourteen local hospitals are represented; 
• Specialty/rehabilitation hospitals: two local facilities; 
• Department of Public Health; 
• Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department; 
• Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office; 
• Duval County Emergency Management Division; 
• Private ambulance providers: representatives from the four local 
companies that provide all local interfacility transports; 
• Regional support services: Salvation Army and American Red Cross; 
• State Medical Response Team (SMRT): local representative; 
• Federal Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT): local representative. 
Garnering the participation needed to address patient surge issues demands 
involvement from partners above and beyond the list provided. Private partners should be 
brought into the early discussions of preparing to mitigate catastrophic patient surge in a 
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region. Requiring active participation from all parties can promote the emergence of the 
coalition framework and the sustainability needed to ensure response readiness across an 
entire community, not just the healthcare community. Emergence demands that the 
behavior of the whole (of community) is more than the sum of the parts.64  
3. King County Healthcare Coalition 
Participation in the King County Healthcare Coalition is actively sought from the 
staff at the KCHC. Membership is solicited from both the nongovernmental healthcare 
arena and the government response arena. Membership is open to all organizations and 
individuals that provide or support healthcare services in King County.65 Key 
stakeholders are identified from regional needs analysis on patient surge, as well as 
through city and county charters that dictate jurisdictional responsibilities.66 
KCHC advocates for “assessing the current landscape” of the entire healthcare 
community when determining the participants needed for the coalition.67 Once identified, 
partners from across each region and discipline are invited to join and expected to 
provide valuable insight into emergency-response procedures related to patient surge 
from catastrophic health events. Key stakeholders in the healthcare community are 
encouraged to sit on the governing body of the coalition, known as the executive council. 
Active participation is sought across the wide realm of healthcare with a constant focus 
on the mission of “building a strong and coordinated framework for coordinated response 
within Seattle and King County.”68  
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KCHC is heavily branded with an easily recognized logo worn by all coalition 
staff and members and printed on all media products. The staff maintains an interactive 
Web site linking the coalition to the King County Health Department. The coalition staff 
has also created online toolkits on subjects ranging from creating or enhancing a 
healthcare coalition to establishing alternate care sites. It has developed full-color 
brochures and posters that are distributed across the region to potential partners. Potential 
members are inundated with information about the coalition and made well aware of the 
benefits of membership, which include: 
• Access and technical support for WAtrac, the state’s Web-based 
healthcare incident management software, linking all healthcare 
organizations in the state; 
• Regional training exercises; 
• Activities, tools, and resources that support hospital patient surge 
preparedness; 
• Activities, tools, and resources that support accreditation; 
• Regional planning, including legal agreements between all healthcare 
partners; 
• Advocacy and visibility with emergency management officials; 
• Quarterly disaster preparedness healthcare forums. 
Participating agencies in the KCHC number more than 300, all of which are 
named on the coalition Web site. The agencies range in disciplines from A Caring Adult 
Family Day Home to the Washington Poison Center.69 Every member agency has a 
discipline-specific role in mitigating the effects of a mass-casualty patient surge event. 
Working within the coalition framework enables the large number of agencies to leverage 
their resources in a more effective and efficient manner for response to any catastrophic 
health event. 
KCHC provides an example of strengthening participation through recognizing 
the affiliation needs of an organization. As the size of the coalition grows, it creates a 
large “in-group” of members. Agencies that are not members of the coalition feel the 
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need to join and be in the “in-group” so that they can enjoy the same benefits that the 
other members enjoy. The “in-group” is further differentiated through branding that 
identifies an agency or person as a member of the coalition. The challenge is in taking the 
individual disciplines that make up a coalition and reframing their group identity to 
include the coalition as a whole. KCHC understands the importance of using logos in 
branding and creating a unified approach to achieving the coordination and collaboration 
needed in a mass-casualty response. KCHC accomplishes this through two methods: 
First, by developing a single overarching goal that all individual members feel they play a 
part in; and second, in creating a sense of belonging through visible group identifiers, 
such as uniforms with logos and membership status, listing participating agencies in 
highly visible locations, offering business cards or letterhead rights that tout affiliation. 
As advanced and progressive as the King County Healthcare Coalition is, it seems 
to approach the needs for coalition participation in the simplest of terms. In order to 
adequately mitigate the patient surge that will accompany a catastrophic health event, one 
needs buy-in and active participation from the entire healthcare community in the region. 
Getting the needed buy-in requires approaching the healthcare community in the same 
manner that one would approach a person whose participation was desired: tap in to his 
basic needs. 
4. Conclusion 
The three coalitions researched all recognize the importance of complete and 
active participation from the entire healthcare community in mitigating patient surge 
resulting from a catastrophic health event. The MSCC handbook provides that the goal of 
the healthcare coalition in mitigating patient surge is to “provide a central integration 
mechanism for information sharing and management coordination among healthcare 
assets, and also to establish an effective and balanced approach to integrating medical 
assets into the jurisdiction’s ICS [Incident Command System].”70 Obtaining the  
 
                                                 
70 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Executive Summary 
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information needed to accomplish the goal outlined in the MSCC handbook demands 
active participation from the many agencies that make up the complex system of 
healthcare. 
In Thinking in Systems, Donella Meadows explains the importance of the use of 
information in establishing and sustaining participation from members of a complex 
system, stating that “information is what holds systems together and plays a great role in 
determining how they operate.”71 Meadows specifically speaks of breaking “actors” out 
of their bounded rationality so that everyone focuses on a common goal. Bounded 
rationality challenges the thinker to look beyond his own frame of reference and personal 
schema to see possibilities outside his own confines and intellectual structure.72 The 
coalition framework allows individual members to see catastrophic patient surge from a 
group perspective, as opposed to an individual challenge. Bounded rationality is 
expanded through the information now available concerning all of the resources of each 
member. Full and active participation from all members of the healthcare community is 
vital in preparing every region for the patient surge that results from a catastrophic health 
event. 
D. FUNDING MECHANISMS 
Funding is paramount to coalition sustainability. Ensuring that a regional 
healthcare coalition remains operational and sustainable demands short- and long-term 
funding mechanisms that are identified early in the coalition’s inception in order to meet 
immediate needs such as equipment purchases and training, as well as continual needs 
such as staffing and patient-tracking software maintenance.  
The amount of funding that each coalition needs to mitigate patient surge within 
its region will vary as much as the mechanisms used to obtain the funding. They should 
involve a mix of both personal and financial costs to the community and should be shared 
by both public and private stakeholders. 
                                                 
71 Donella Meadows; Thinking in Systems, Kindle E-book location 202; 
72 Donella Meadows; Thinking in Systems,  Kindle E-book location 1109 
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The MSCC handbook suggests that healthcare coalitions be organized as lean as 
possible, keeping financial costs at a minimum.73 Costs will be realized in varying 
degrees by each coalition based on communications, training, technological, or response 
equipment already purchased and maintained by other entities in the region. In this case 
the cost to the coalition is simple networking with other response agencies and building 
on the collaboration that will be needed during a mass-casualty patient surge incident. 
MSCC posits that the personnel time contributed by each member organization to the 
coalition is often the main cost for developing and maintaining a coalition.74 
The federal government has funded the National Healthcare Preparedness 
Program (NHPP) since its inception in 2002 as the National Bioterrorism Hospital 
Preparedness Program. Initial funding was $125 million, which was distributed to states 
with the intent that it be used to fill gaps in preparing hospitals for a bioterrorist attack. 
Program funding grew exponentially after the first year, but as shown in table 1, HPP 
funding has leveled off in the past few years. 75  
Federal funding is awarded to states by way of cooperative agreement (CA) 
grants. Early focus on the purchase of decontamination equipment for hospitals and 
antidotes for bioterrorism has been replaced with a broader focus on preparing the entire 
healthcare community to mitigate any patient surge as a unified coalition. The 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 provided funding to the National Healthcare 
Preparedness Program to “improve the surge capacity and enhance community and 
hospital preparedness for public health emergencies.”76 The NHPP in turn awards the 
money to eligible entities in the form of CA grants. The fiscal year (FY) 2011 grants have 
stipulations that the funding be used for activities that include exercising and improving 
                                                 
73 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, Chapter 5.3.2 
74 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007, The Coalition Emergency Operations Plan 
Chapter 3.3 
75 HHS Fact Sheet: FY10 Hospital Preparedness Program 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Pages/fy10hpp.aspx 
76 HHS Grants Boost Disaster Preparedness in Hospitals, Health Care Systems; News Release July 1, 
2011 HHS Press Office http://www.calhospitalprepare.org/node/933 
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preparedness plans for all-hazards, increasing the ability to provide needed patient beds, 
engaging interoperable communications systems throughout the region, educating and 
training healthcare workers, and enabling healthcare partnerships and coalitions.77 DHHS 
is expanding the scope of the FY12 grant cycle to emphasize the operational needs of 
regional healthcare coalitions across the country.78 
Regional healthcare coalitions should not look to the federal government as their 
only source of funding. Nor should healthcare coalitions think of funding only in 
monetary terms. Financial support is available from public and private donors, corporate 
sponsorships, consultation services, membership fees, and vendor sponsors. The 
following cases exemplify funding options from robust federal support and regional 
sponsorship to membership dues–driven organizations. 
                                                 
77 DHHS FY11 HPP Guide http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Documents/fy2011-hpp-
funding-guidance.pdf 

















Table 1.   NHPP Funding (From: 79) 
1. Palm Beach County HERC 
HERC is organized as a 501(c) (3) nonprofit public-safety entity. It uses a 
combination of funding mechanisms from dedicated contributions to grant application 
opportunities in order to sustain its work and to solicit members from the community. 
HERC recommends that one of the first items a coalition address is the appointment of a 
                                                 
79 HHS Fact Sheet: FY10 Hospital Preparedness Program 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Pages/fy10hpp.aspx 
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fiscal advisor/treasurer.80 This position is needed since most grant funding and group 
purchasing requires a legal entity to receive funding or to benefit from group rates. In 
Palm Beach County, HERC utilizes the Palm Beach County Medical Society as its fiscal 
agent.81 
HERC was initially organized through a substantial grant from the Palm 
Healthcare Foundation. The foundation advertises that it practices “engaged investment,” 
which it defines as “collaborative grant making that builds strong community 
relationships, respects diverse opinions and seeks non-traditional approaches to difficult 
healthcare challenges.”82 The foundation attempts to combine regional assets and 
expertise when issuing grants, often pairing nontraditional partners in finding creative 
solutions to healthcare needs. The diverse multidiscipline membership of HERC makes it 
a perfect fit with the Palm Healthcare Foundation, which seeks to create a tightly woven 
community of healthcare providers. HERC has maintained a relationship with the 
foundation since the initial funding at its inception. A majority of the funding provided 
by the Palm Foundation is specified for planning and administrative support, but it also 
includes specific funding targeting equipment and training needed to mitigate patient 
surge from a catastrophic health event, such as the 2005 purchase of patient-tracking 
software used throughout the region in mass-casualty incidents.83 
HERC has also received federal grant funding through the state’s Regional 
Domestic Security Task Force—Region 7 for the purchase of a region-wide syndromic 
surveillance system, interoperable communications equipment, and a Web-based hospital 
                                                 
80 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location 982 of 2343 
81 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location 989 of 2343 
82 Palm Healthcare Foundation Website: Accessed 1/26/12 
http://www.palmhealthcare.org/Grantmakingphilosophy 
83 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location 527 of 2343 
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incident management system that allows all healthcare partners to continually monitor 
hospital census information for potential patient surge crises.84  
 Local, state, and federal funding is often given to regions willing to pool their 
resources. This proved an attractive offer for HERC, which incorporates over 35 agencies 
within the 2,023 square miles of its county. 
HERC Funding from  











Table 2.   Annual PHF Contributions to HERC (From: 85) 
While grants make up the majority of HERC’s funding streams, they are not the 
only mechanism relied on for sustainability. Grant funding comes in cycles and is 
constantly shifting focus to meet the immediate needs of a community. HERC realized 
this early on and solicited funding from various sources. To garner support from the 
community, HERC invested early on in building awareness through communicating its  
 
                                                 
84 HERC of Palm Beach County Community Report; 2008-2008; Summary of Accomplishments and 
Activities Grants Received; 
http://cache.trustedpartner.com/docs/library/PalmBeachMedicalSociety2009/Content/HERC/HERC%2020
07-08%20community%20report.pdf 
85 Information for table gathered from Annual Financial Reports from Palm Beach County Healthcare 
Emergency Response Coalition. Reports gathered from Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; and from Palm Healthcare Foundation annual reports: 
http://www.palmhealthcare.org/recentgrants   
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mission to the public, community leaders, and the media.86 Through an active public 
relations campaign philanthropic, federal, state, and local partners emerged and provided 
HERC with funding and additional marketing opportunities.  
HERC gets additional funding through membership fees from each participating 
agency. The fee is minimal, currently $450 per year, and is used toward operational 
expenses for the dedicated staff of HERC.87  
Requiring a nominal membership fee of participating agencies also has the added benefit 
of giving the agencies a sense of ownership in decision making and group direction.  
Member agencies are also encouraged to provide funding through “in-kind 
services,” such as when the Palm Beach County Fire and Rescue Department provided 
personal protective equipment and decontamination training to all regional hospitals at no 
cost to HERC.88 One of the most creative means of funding that HERC has realized is 
through the sale of the book Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition. 
The book was written by three founding members of HERC as a guide to community 
stakeholders; it walks them through the process of creating a healthcare coalition.89 To 
date, this is the only text available that is dedicated to establishing a healthcare coalition. 
Profits from the sale of the book go directly to Palm Beach County’s HERC.90 
HERC was recognized in 2007 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and the American Medical Association as a model community program for emergency 
preparedness. The award specifically speaks to HERC’s ability to create a “self-
                                                 
86 Guide To Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition; 2008 Publication of Palm 
Beach Healthcare Foundation West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Section 5 – Secure and Sustain Funding Pp. 
13 
87 National Association of County and City Health Officials; Program Details – Healthcare Emergency 
Response Coalition of Palm Beach County (HERC); 
http://naccho.org/topics/modelpractices/database/practice.cfm?PracticeID=61 
88 Guide To Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition; 2008 Publication of Palm 
Beach Healthcare Foundation West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Section 5 – Secure and Sustain Funding Pp. 
13 
89 Jay Lee, Thomas W. Cleare and Mary Russell; Establishing a Healthcare Emergency Response 
Coalition; Government Institutes The Scarecrow Press; Kindle E-book location  162 of 2343 




sustaining coalition through the responsible use of seed funding and ongoing support 
from the Palm Healthcare Foundation resulting in a series of protocols on preparing for 
and responding to any mass casualty incident; and also for their ability to reach out to 
traditional and non-traditional partners in the healthcare community for financial and 
personal support involving the whole-of-community in disaster preparedness.”91 Palm 
Beach County’s HERC is an example of variety and creativity as the key to funding 
coalition sustainment. 
2. Jacksonville, Florida 
FCDC has by far the lowest annual budget of the three chosen for this research. 
The only dedicated stream of funding that the coalition receives comes from annual 
membership dues from each participating agency. The 2010/2011 membership dues were 
$400.00 per agency and were received from 16 different member organizations. This 
amount was recently upheld for 2011/2012. The governance structure of FCDC demands 
that a financial report be delivered at each meeting by the elected treasurer, who acts as 
the fiscal agent for the coalition. All funding matters are voted on by the membership at 
large, with a simple majority required for approval. FCDC is organized as a 501 (c) (3) 
nonprofit organization, making it eligible for most federal grant funding, as well as public 
and private donations. There is currently no dedicated position within FCDC focused on 
soliciting funding outside of the membership dues. 
The FCDC does not have any overhead expenses or staff members, a large portion 
of the expenses for which other coalitions must secure long-term funding. Expenditures 
over the past three years include attendance at annual disaster-preparedness conferences, 
liability insurance for full-scale exercises, the annual awards dinner, and miscellaneous 
clerical fees.92 The FCDC does not take the leading role in purchasing large-ticket items 
                                                 
91 Palm Beach County Healthcare Emergency Response Coalition; Press Release August 13, 2007; 
“HERC Wins National Award”;  
https://www.trustedpartner.com/docs/library/000141/FINALHERC%20%20jays%20version%20cdc%20a
ward%20with%20picture%202.pdf  
92 Personal copy of 2009/2010/2011 FCDC financial report to membership body, on file at Duval 
County Emergency Management Division, Office of Health and Medical Preparedness, 515 North Julia 
Street, Jacksonville Florida 32202, Attn: EPD Office 
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to prepare the community for mass-casualty patient surge events, such as interoperable 
communications systems or mass decontamination equipment. Grant funding for these 
items is generally coordinated through the county grants administrators, located within 
the DCEMD. Attachment to a large and progressive emergency management department 
has taken much of the funding load off the coalition. This is both a benefit to the FCDC 
and a challenge in keeping up to date on funding opportunities and visions for both 
organizations. The FCDC meets this challenge through active involvement within the 
DCEMD health and medical branch and reverse involvement within the FCDC from 
members of the DCEMD. Tapping into the collegiality discussed earlier in participation 
needs has proven effective in meeting much of the FCDC’s funding needs. 
A funding benefit that the FCDC experiences as a result of the collegiality it 
fosters is the joint use of hospital grant funding targeted for disaster preparedness. This 
funding is generally received through direct grants from the National Healthcare 
Preparedness Program through ASPR. The FCDC assumed leadership roles in two 
ASPR-funded exercises in 2011: a full-scale mass-casualty patient surge exercise at the 
Jacksonville International Airport and a tabletop exercise testing alternate-care facility 
plans for mitigating mass patient surge. The funding for each exercise was assumed by 
the hospital or hospitals receiving the ASPR grant. The FCDC provided guidance in 
planning, soliciting volunteers, networking key stakeholders in the community, and 
documenting the exercise through the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP).  
The leadership role that the FCDC has in networking all of the healthcare 
community does not currently require the funding streams that the other coalitions have 
in place. The FCDC is an example of funding that is not necessarily financial. While the 
funding for the FCDC is distinctively different from that of Palm Beach County’s HERC 
and King County’s KCHC, the FCDC is still able to influence the surge capacity and 
capability needs of its region and sustain its coalition. Recently, the FCDC has begun 
looking for additional funding mechanisms to strengthen its preparedness level and bring 
in additional healthcare partners to broaden the membership. 
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3. King County, Washington KCHC 
King County, Washington’s Healthcare Coalition is the most highly funded of the 
three coalitions. KCHC was established in 2005 through a grant from DHHS and is 
housed within the Department of Public Health. The initial grant sustained the coalition, 
including a full-time staff of 12, through the first three years. Additional grant funding 
and an aggressive campaign for local donors have maintained the coalition since that 
time. KCHC is in partnership with a 501(c) (3) nonprofit organization, the Foundation for 
Health Care Quality, for all charitable contributions.  
In 2010, KCHC began work to broaden its funding base from predominantly 
federal grant monies to long-term sustainable partnerships within its region. Since that 
time it has reached out to corporate sponsors and now has an extensive list of financial 
backers. KCHC lists its sponsors by level of annual donation, starting at $25,000 and 
moving down to $500 sponsorships. The 2011 list of corporate sponsors who gave more 
than $500 totaled 13, two of which are $25,000 donors. Coalition sponsors receive public 
acknowledgment on the coalition’s Web site, in its monthly newsletter, at all conferences, 
in staff presentations, and in an annual newspaper advertisement thanking all sponsors.93 
KCHC looks beyond the corporate arena to solicit membership from the 
healthcare community that will benefit most from the work the coalition does in 
preparing for catastrophic health events. The healthcare community extends from public 
hospitals to private hospitals and healthcare providers to private businesses needed to 
sustain the healthcare system during a time of disaster. Membership dues for participants 
are recommended based on annual corporate revenues for each participating agency. 
KCHC currently has over 300 participating agencies paying annual dues ranging from 
$500 to $1,000.94 KCHC touts the benefits of membership, including:95  
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94 King County Healthcare Coalition; http://www.kingcountyhealthcarecoalition.org/sponsor-the-
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• Regional training and exercises that test organizational and regional 
capabilities for a mass-casualty patient surge; 
• Technical support for the use of WATrac (Washington State’s patient-
tracking software); 
• Activities, tools, and resources that support accreditation and licensing 
demands; 
• Regional planning and agreements that lead to improved coordination and 
access to resources during a catastrophic health event; 
• Collaboration and peer support that lead to more transparent and effective 
preparedness outcomes. 
Members are continually reminded of the importance of the coalition in preparing 
King County’s healthcare system for a disaster. Funds are used to purchase advertising 
promoting preparedness and prevention efforts for pandemic health events, natural 
disasters, and terrorist attacks.96 The funding is also used to hold more than 30 training 
exercises and 50 meetings and workshops per year, all focused on preparing the region 
for a catastrophic health event.97 Every participant is invited to attend with active 
involvement from key stakeholders expected.  
KCHC is in a unique position to leverage its formal governance structure within 
the Department of Public Health and county Emergency Management Division to solicit 
broad-based participation. This in turn results in unlimited participant-driven funding 
streams. The funding mechanisms used by KCHC serve to self-perpetuate the coalition 
through the constant renewal of memberships, which are easy to attract, given the 
benefits that KCHC is able to offer those who participate. 
4. Conclusion 
Funding will always be one of the biggest challenges to any organization’s ability 
to operate and sustain its mission. Healthcare coalitions are no exception. Identifying 
adequate funding streams to fulfill a coalition’s mission demands a constant review of 
                                                 
96 King County Healthcare Coalition Accomplishments 
http://www.kingcountyhealthcarecoalition.org/media/Accomplishments_06-11.pdf 
97 King County Healthcare Coalition  Accomplishments 
http://www.kingcountyhealthcarecoalition.org/media/Accomplishments_06-11.pdf 
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existing funding opportunities and the creation of new and creative ones. Short- and long-
term funding mechanisms should be identified across the spectrum from public grant 
opportunities to private donations.  
Providing opportunities to strengthen coalitions is the focus of the 2012 ASPR 
cooperative grant cycle. In January of 2012, ASPR issued the National Guidance for 
Healthcare System Preparedness—Healthcare Preparedness Capabilities List.98 It lists 
eight capabilities as the basis for healthcare coalition preparedness. The list was a 
combination of ASPR-outlined capabilities for healthcare preparedness and the 15 public 
health emergency preparedness capabilities released in March of 2011.99  
1. Healthcare system preparedness; 
2. Healthcare system recovery; 
3. Emergency operations coordination; 
4. Fatality management; 
5. Information sharing; 
6. Medical surge; 
7. Responder safety and health; 
8. Volunteer management. 
In an effort to assist regions with meeting these capabilities, ASPR is providing 
approximately $350 million annually to states, localities, and territories within the United 
States through the HPP cooperative agreement grant program. Being focused exclusively 
on healthcare coalitions, ASPR recognizes the role it plays in mitigating mass-casualty 
patient surge events.  
                                                 
98 “Healthcare preparedness capabilities”; United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/reports/Documents/capabilities.pdf 
99 “Healthcare preparedness capabilities”; United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/reports/Documents/capabilities.pdf 
 60 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61 
V. FINDINGS 
Disasters involving human casualties often come with little or no warning for the 
healthcare community tasked with triaging and treating the sick and injured. A 
coordinated and collaborative approach from the entire healthcare community is needed 
to mitigate the patient surge seen in mass-casualty disasters. As evidenced in this 
research, regional healthcare coalitions are able to enhance medical surge capacity 
utilizing various forms of governance, differing levels of participation, and multiple 
means of funding. 
Regional healthcare coalitions are as diverse as the communities they serve. It has 
been said about the differences in fusion centers that “if you’ve seen one fusion center, 
you’ve seen one fusion center.” This could just as easily be said about healthcare 
coalitions and is not necessarily a negative take on either. Regional healthcare coalitions 
serve specific regions with specific needs. Identifying what those specific needs are for 
each region will guide the creation and sustainment of any regional healthcare coalition.  
Palm Beach County’s HERC realized the power in associating with an established 
leader in the local healthcare community and building its governance structure within that 
organization. By positioning the administrative needs of its coalition within the local 
medical society, it was able to concentrate its efforts on preparing the healthcare 
community for a mass-casualty patient surge and soliciting participation from all aspects 
of healthcare. The ability to align with an existing regional healthcare entity is an 
attractive option for many communities; as evidenced by Palm Beach County’s HERC, it 
enhances the ability to collectively respond to a mass casualty or pandemic patient surge. 
The FCDC exemplifies a self-sustaining supportive model of a regional healthcare 
coalition. Each of the key stakeholders within the coalition maintains primary 
responsibilities to the home agency. With no formal coalition notification center or 
designated duty-call position assigned to the role of the FCDC during a catastrophic 
health event, the need for a healthcare coalition in the region may appear moot. On the 
contrary, the FCDC fulfills the precise purpose and scope of a healthcare coalition as 
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outlined by the DHHS in the 2010 Healthcare Coalition Handbook: “using a medical 
Multiagency Coordination System that supports, but does not supplant, the incident 
response activities of individual healthcare organizations (in Tier 1) and jurisdictional 
authorities (in Tier 3).”100 By acting as the clearinghouse for information from the 
individual healthcare organizations, the FCDC is able to support the needs of the incident 
commander from its position in ESF-8 at the EOC. 
 
Figure 5.   Coalition Supportive Action Plan (From: 101) 
The FCDC demonstrates the ability to provide the support needed to mitigate a 
mass-casualty patient surge for a large metropolitan area without having the formal 
structure and funding of other healthcare coalitions. This is possible due to the existence  
                                                 
100 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
Public Health Emergency Workgroup; Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 2007; Executive 
Summary 
101 Joseph A. Barbera and Anthony G. Macintyre; Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook; 
2nd edition, Prepared for the US DHHS and ASPR 2007,Tier 2 Coalition Action Plan Chapter 3.3.1 Figure 
3-1 
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of a strong emergency management division within the region that assumes command 
positions during disasters and incorporates mass-casualty patient surge needs in its 
funding plans.  
King County’s healthcare coalition provides a look into the extreme possibilities a 
healthcare coalition could provide to a region. Slated as one of the model healthcare 
coalition programs by the DHHS, KCHC demonstrates the utmost in a “whole-of-
community” approach to healthcare.102 As demonstrated by the number of participating 
agencies in the coalition (more than 300), the number of corporate sponsorships (more 
than 25), the publication of numerous online coalition toolkits, and the support of local 
jurisdictional authorities, KCHC is able to assume a leadership role in the incident 
command structure as well as providing the support needed for a mass-casualty event. 
This would not be possible were it not for the aggressive funding mechanisms that KCHC 
uses to sustain its work. 
Each of the three coalitions examined in this research approached patient surge 
planning and preparedness with different forms of governance, different levels of 
participation, and different means of funding. All were able to demonstrate success in 
enhancing patient surge mitigation within their respective regions. 
                                                 
102The Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Hospitals Rising To The 
Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program and Priorities Going 
Forward; Overview of Partnerships; 2011; Printed Copy available online at: http://www.upmc-
biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009-04-16-hppreport.html 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The threat of a patient surge will never be completely eliminated. Preparedness 
for an event that results in a mass patient surge must be an ongoing process for hospitals 
and the healthcare community as a whole. Weaknesses in the level of readiness for a 
catastrophic health event must be identified across every region and accompanied by 
viable solutions for the weaknesses identified. 
In a 2008 article published in the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, the authors 
explain the need for a clear strategic vision in addressing surge capacity. The article 
states that “surge capacity is not just an organization’s ability to mobilize an emergency 
response or rapidly deploy staff, but rather it is the result of a continual process from 
preparedness and planning through to response, and on to recovery.”103  
 
Figure 6.   Surge Capacity: The Case for Integrated Interventions (From: 104) 
                                                 
103 Ben Emmens and Rachel Houghton; Understanding Surge Capacity within International Agencies; 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, June 2008,Issue 39 
104 Ben Emmens and Rachel Houghton; Understanding Surge Capacity within International Agencies; 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, June 2008,Issue 39 Figure 1 
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Regions across the United States should continually prepare for a patient surge 
from a catastrophic health event through the establishment of a fully functional and active 
healthcare coalition. The coalition should be custom designed to the needs of the region 
and involve the full spectrum of the local healthcare community. The midst of the 
disaster is not the time to create a plan on how to best mitigate a patient surge. Mass-
casualty injuries and illnesses rely on time-sensitive decisions made by healthcare 
providers in order to save the most lives. Continual planning and preparedness efforts 
through the use of regional healthcare coalitions provide the coordination and 
collaboration needed to mitigate any mass-casualty patient surge that may strike a 
community.  
The research demonstrated that it mattered little the specific governance structures 
of a coalition, or extent of participation in the coalition, or the level of funding the 
coalition enjoyed. What mattered was that the structure, participation, and funding match 
the needs of the specific region in preparing for a patient surge. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The health and well-being of a society drives decisions made from the executive 
levels of government to the personal choices of individuals. Those decisions are often 
based on a perception that the healthcare community is able to handle a crisis of any 
magnitude. History is evidence that this may not be the case. From the devastating floods 
of hurricane Katrina to the destructive tornados of Joplin, Missouri, the healthcare 
community has witnessed the need to come together as a unified system in the face of 
mass casualties and patient surges. While many hospitals and healthcare organizations 
operate competitively on a daily basis, they must realize the need to come together during 
a time of disaster. How the healthcare community unifies is not a simple straightforward 
formula. As seen in this research, variations of collaboration and interoperability existed 
in how each coalition framed its structure, membership, and funding, but each met the 
need of enhancing its region’s ability to respond to mass-casualty patient surges. 
Measuring the success of a coalition’s preparedness for a patient surge does not 
have a quantifiable figure, nor is it necessary that an actual mass casualty occur to test 
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preparedness. Harry P. Hatry describes how nonprofits providing healthcare services to a 
community can demonstrate preparedness to their funders and stakeholders.105 He 
recommends that the organization, or in this case the coalition, link its outcomes to its 
mission. The mission of the healthcare organization in preparing for a patient surge is met 
by creating a unified system through a collaborative environment that fosters 
interoperability among all entities. For a coalition to measure success, it should structure 
its governance, participation, and funding to meet its mission of a unified healthcare 
community. 
This research was limited in the number of coalitions examined and alternatives to 
mitigating mass-casualty patient surge. As concluded in this research, the number of 
variations by which a healthcare coalition can be structured, funded, and enlisted vary 
considerably from region to region. Understanding that there are additional options for 
meeting the needs of a patient surge in mass casualties or pandemic events works to 
further the conclusion that it matters less how a community of healthcare providers 
comes together than it does that they actually come together. Healthcare communities 
across the nation should take the information included here as examples of how these 
distinctively different regions created healthcare coalitions and draw from it similarities 
and differences they can use in their own communities to create a fully functional 
healthcare coalition.  
Additional research into how a region begins the process of creating a coalition 
would be beneficial to those in need of a healthcare coalition. The three cases examined 
in this research emerged from either specific incidents, as was the case with Palm Beach 
County’s HERC, or through the shared need of hospital accreditation–required training as 
was the case with Jacksonville’s FCDC, or through an agency-driven mission, as was the 
case with the Department of Public Health in King County, Washington. This research 
would be enhanced by further discussion about who assumes the responsibility for 
ensuring that all regions establish a healthcare coalition.  
                                                 
105 Harry P. Hatry, Jake Cowan, Ken Weider and Linda Lampkin; Developing Community-wide 
Outcome Indicators for Specific Services; June 01, 2003;  http://www.urban.org/publications/310813.html 
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The federal government has thus far only issued guidelines for implementation and 
financial incentives to creating a coalition. Is there a single coalition structure that every 
region could assume? If so, would the three cases above fit into that structure?  
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APPENDIX A. COMPARISON OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE 
HERC FCDC KCHC 
Development of comprehensive 
Emergency Operations Plan Yes 













MOU /MOA / LOA used between 
coalition partners 






MOA with all 
participants and 
corporate sponsors 
Interoperability plan with Tier 3 public 
sector agencies in place In progress 
Yes, fully 
interoperable with 
all Tier 3 partners 
Yes, fully 
interoperable with 
all Tier 3 partners 
Ability to rapidly disseminate healthcare 
information from coalition to incident 
















software system.  
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HERC FCDC KCHC 
Coalition open to all members of 
the healthcare community Yes  Yes Yes  
Active solicitation for members 
by coalition staff Yes No Yes 
Public relations benefits 
available to members through 
association with coalition 
Yes No Yes 
Mutual aid agreements with 
surrounding regions Yes Yes Yes 
Active participation from all 
regional hospitals Yes Yes Yes 
Active participation from private 
corporations Yes No Yes 
Active involvement of 
participating members in 
exercises and training  
Yes Yes Yes 
Recognition and support of local 
authorities having jurisdiction Yes Yes Yes 
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HERC FCDC KCHC 
Full-time grant 
administrator dedicated 
to securing grant funding 
Yes No Yes 
Fiscal agent assigned Yes Yes Yes 
Membership dues 
required by all 
participating corporate 
agencies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Funds received from 
Private Foundations Yes No  Yes 
Administrative positions 
supported by grants Yes No Yes 
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